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 Many proponents of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) assert that its principles are 
applicable in the area of military operations.  One way in which this is evidenced is the ever-
present discussion of the tactical bomber versus the strategic bomber as an example of DDE’s 
application, used by most DDE scholars to illustrate the difference between permissible and 
impermissible action under DDE’s tenets.  The goal of this paper is not to agree or disagree with 
DDE as a moral theory, but to propose that DDE is an unnecessary and ineffective tool in 
determining the propriety of military actions.  The foundation of this argument is the notion that 
DDE should be thought of as a “second-level” theory that serves only to guide the formulation of 
“first-level” norms of behavior.1  After that, DDE is largely a useless resource in determining the 
permissibility of an agent’s action due to its potential applicability in only a handful of very 
specific, unrealistic circumstances. 
Though the concept of “collateral damage” as used in the military sense closely 
resembles the principles of DDE, collateral damage is not the only regularly used, or even the 
only commonly accepted, means of determining whether a particular military action is 
permissible.  Other concepts, such as proportionality, necessity and discrimination, play a more 
important and concrete role in military theory, with collateral damage analyses only one factor in 
the equation of permissibility.  It is this paper’s position that these other elements, already firmly 
embedded in the Law of War, are jointly self-sufficient and indeed much less complicated in 
practice than DDE.  As such, in reaching the conclusion that an operation is permissible, one 
need not rely on such a theoretical moral equation as DDE and, in fact, war would be made more 
complicated, and the propriety of war operations much more subjective and fluid, by such a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The concept of “second-level theory” versus “first-level norms” was an idea brought to the author’s attention by 
Professor Horacio Spector, University of San Diego Law School, in Spring 2014 in a classroom setting wherein the 
topic of the course was “Ethics, Law and International Affairs.” 
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solely morality-based approach.  Though elements of the Law of War were no doubt influenced 
by DDE, the latter has outlived its utility and is, therefore, wholly superfluous and ill-advised in 
a modern military setting.  
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND OF DOUBLE EFFECT 
 The Doctrine of Double Effect, in its most simplified form, is a moral theory used to 
determine whether a particular course of action adheres to an acceptable set of moral principles – 
if it does, the action is considered morally permissible, and if it doesn’t, it is considered morally 
impermissible.  The doctrine is based on certain foundational principles that, if met, lead to the 
conclusion that an action is morally justified.  The New Catholic Encyclopedia lays out the four 
requirements for the application of DDE thusly: 
1) The act itself must be morally good or at least indifferent; 
2) The agent may not positively will the bad effect, but may allow it, unless he can avoid 
it (in which case he should); 
3) The good effect must flow directly from the act and not from the bad effect; 
4) The good effect must sufficiently compensate for the bad effect.2  
Generally speaking, DDE states that it is morally permissible to cause harm, even if it is foreseen, 
if such harm is a side effect of an intended positive result.  This is the case even if causing the 
harm would not be permissible if directly intended.  In other words, it is permissible to bring 
about a harmful side effect that is merely foreseen though it may be impermissible to bring about 
the same harmful effect intentionally.  The doctrine, then, focuses on the intent of the agent 
rather than the consequences of the agent’s actions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 As referenced in Alison McIntyre, “Doctrine of Double Effect,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 
2011, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/. 
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DDE’s roots are thought to derive from Saint Thomas Aquinas’ 13th century Summa 
Theologica, wherein he discussed the possibility that killing in self-defense may be permissible 
as a side effect of protecting one’s own life.3  “Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, 
only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention,” Aquinas wrote.  
“Accordingly, the act of self-defense may have two effects; one, the saving of one’s life; the 
other, the slaying of the aggressor.”4  Aquinas based the justification for both effects on a 
characterization of the action as a means to achieving a justifiable goal.  He does urge a limit, 
however, on the extent to which such effects may be pursued, relying on a proportionality 
assessment.  “And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered 
unlawful if it be out of proportion to the end.  Wherefore, if a man in self-defense uses more than 
necessary violence, it will be unlawful, whereas, if he repel force with moderation his defense 
will be lawful.”5  It should be noted that Aquinas did not offer an opinion on whether intending 
to kill one’s enemy as a means of self-defense would be permissible. 
Modern interpretations of Aquinas’ theory, however, emphasize the distinction between 
intending to cause the harm as a means to a good end and causing the harm “unintentionally” as 
a foreseen side effect of pursuing a good end.  As Alison McIntyre writes, “The principle of 
double effect is directed at well-intentioned agents who ask whether they may cause a serious 
harm in order to bring about a good end of overriding moral importance when it is impossible to 
bring about the good end without the harm.”6  Some scholars categorize this distinction as 
instrumental versus incidental harm, or intended versus merely foreseen harm.7  While all moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Id. 
4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Benzinger Bros, 1947, as quoted in McIntyre, supra note 2. 
5 Id. 
6 McIntyre, supra note 2. 
7 For example, see Alison McIntyre, “Doing Away With Double Effect,” Ethics, Vol. 111 (January 2001), and 
Alison Hills, “Defending Double Effect,” Philosophical Studies Vol. 116 (2003), pp. 133-152. 
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theorists would agree that intending harm as an end is impermissible (for example, pre-meditated 
murder), the fundamental element of DDE is the allegedly significant difference between harm 
that is intended as a means to a good end and harm that is not intended, but may be foreseen as a 
result of pursuing the means to a good end.  The modern theory, then, combines a general 
prohibition on instrumentally causing harm as a means for the sake of achieving a good end and 
a special permission for causing that harm incidentally when it occurs as a side effect of the 
pursuit of a good end.  Perhaps an example would best illustrate the difference.  Imagine a doctor 
who wants to alleviate the pain of a terminally ill patient by administering morphine, which in 
turn causes the death of the patient.  If the doctor sought to relieve the patient’s pain by 
intentionally hastening her death with a lethal dose of morphine, it would be morally 
impermissible, but if he merely foresaw that hastening her death may result as a side effect of the 
same dose of morphine, yet his intent was only to alleviate her pain, his action would be morally 
permissible.   
Modern DDE proponents also include Aquinas’ proportionality factor and acknowledge 
that such a proportionality condition must be met when DDE is applied.  As Alison Hills 
explains, “According to DDE, it is morally worse for an agent to bring about some intended bad 
consequence than to bring about that consequence when it is merely foreseen, provided that the 
agent’s intention is good, that she does not want or intend that the bad consequence occur and 
that the foreseen harm she brings about is proportionate to the intended good.”8  Therefore, in the 
above example, the doctor’s use of morphine would not be justified simply because he didn’t 
intend the patient’s death, but rather only if such a powerful drug is indicated as an appropriate 
method of relieving her particular pain (as opposed to, say, using morphine to alleviate a 
headache, which would be disproportionate and thus impermissible). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Hills, supra note 7, p. 133. 
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Hills pushes the analysis even further by distinguishing between ways in which an actor 
intends harm as a means to an end; she discusses “mere means” versus “plan-relative ends”9 and 
claims that there is a moral distinction between the two in that the latter is akin to intending a 
harm as an end (which, as mentioned, is generally considered to be morally impermissible).  
According to Hills, it is morally worse to intend harm as an end because in doing so, the agent 
treats the harm as if it were valuable for its own sake.  On the other hand, an agent who intends 
harm as a mere means does not treat the harm as valuable in and of itself, but rather as only 
valuable in the pursuit of some good end.  It is here where Hills stretches the traditional concept 
of DDE into the two branches mentioned.  Her contention is that an agent may pursue an end 
directly, and treat the means to that end as “mere means,” or the agent can pursue the end 
indirectly, and treat the means to that end as “plan-relative ends” that will help the agent reach 
the ultimate goal.10  The difference is this: with mere means, the actor is only committed to 
bringing about the ultimate end; the means to the end are not valuable in themselves but only as 
they relate to achievement of the end.  In trying to attain the end, the agent monitors only the 
level to which she has achieved that end.  With plan-relative ends, both the means and the 
ultimate end are independently valuable, with the agent’s focus on the extent to which the 
individual means are achieved with the expectation that such means will ultimately result in 
achieving the desired end.   
The decision-making model Hills has in mind is as follows.  In pursuing a goal, the agent 
develops a plan, and the means are the intermediate steps in that plan that lead to the ultimate 
goal, with the agent committed to each waypoint along the way as necessary pieces of the bigger 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Id. 
10 Id., p. 145. “If you pursue some good directly by an evil means, you are not treating the evil means as if it were 
valuable for its own sake, you are treating it as a mere means to something valuable for its own sake….But if you 
pursue some good indirectly by an evil means, you do not treat your evil means as if they are mere means; you treat 
them as plan-relative ends, as if they are valuable for their own sake.” 
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puzzle. The example Hills uses is a person trying to be happier.  If he attempts to directly pursue 
his goal and is only concerned with the end result of being happier, his only metric is the extent 
to which he has succeeded in that goal, with little focus on the means used to reach the goal.  If 
he attempts to indirectly pursue his goal, he will develop a plan he thinks will best contribute to 
reaching that goal, perhaps by being nicer to his friends, taking better care of himself, getting 
outside more, etc.  As he progresses on his path, he monitors his success in achieving each of the 
plan-relative ends, rather than focus on the ultimate goal itself, and presumes that success in each 
plan-relative end will lead to overall success in reaching his desired goal.  Hills argues that, 
while this indirect pursuit is often more successful, those plan-relative ends are just that – ends – 
and therefore intending harm at any of those intermediate steps would be morally worse than 
merely foreseeing harm.  “[I]f an agent who intends some harm as an end has a ‘bad attitude,’ an 
agent who intends some harm as a plan-relative end also has a ‘bad attitude’; if it is morally 
worse to intend some harm as an end than to foresee bringing it about, it is morally worse to 
intend some harm as a plan-relative end than to foresee bringing it about.”11 
We can understand Hills’s view by examining the way in which she applies her plan-
relative ends analysis to a war scenario. She proposes a case in which a commander develops a 
plan to achieve his ultimate goal to win the war depending upon the information available to him 
at the time.  The commander can pursue that end in two ways: directly, by focusing only on 
whether he wins or loses the war, or indirectly, by adopting a plan he believes will best 
contribute to winning the war and then focusing on achieving each intermediate step.  Under 
normal circumstances, it would be wisest for the commander to pursue his plan indirectly, 
concentrating on bombing each military objective rather than on his overall success at winning 
the war.  In destroying the targets, the commander knows he will cause some deaths, but he does 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Id., p. 137. 
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not aim at killing and therefore does not have a “bad attitude” toward the harm.  The same is true 
if the commander pursues winning the war directly.  It is interesting to note that Hills applies this 
result to a terrorist as well, but only if the terrorist pursues his plan directly.  According to Hills, 
in a direct pursuit, the terrorist, who chooses to kill and terrify civilians as a means to win the 
war, need not believe that the killing is good for its own sake, but only that it is valuable in 
relation to its effectiveness at bringing about a justifiable end.  She does, however, use DDE to 
create a hierarchy of morality, with the strategic commander, in both direct and indirect pursuit, 
morally better than the terrorist in direct pursuit (which, in turn, is better than the terrorist in 
indirect pursuit whereby he values killing as a plan-relative end and is therefore morally wrong).   
In my view, though, this distinction lacks practical foundation.  It seems to me that 
Hills’s hierarchical distinction, and DDE generally, are simply tools of setting apart the “good 
guys” (conventional, strategic warriors) from the “bad guys” (terrorist warriors) and justifying 
harm that would otherwise lack justification (specifically, directly causing civilian deaths).  
Indeed, DDE says that the key factor in determining morality of an action is whether the harm 
was intended, but neither Hills nor other DDE theorists define “intended” with any precision.  
DDE defenders claim that a strategic commander who intends to bomb military objectives but 
incidentally causes civilian deaths is morally justified despite the fact that the civilian deaths 
were foreseen and the commander still made the conscious decision to drop the bomb, meaning 
that his action was intentional, even if he did not intend the resulting harm.  One could argue that 
the terrorist behaves in quite a similar way – he does not intend the harm because his desired end 
is winning the war.12  In both cases civilian deaths are both foreseen and directly caused.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This position is also espoused by Horacio Spector in Autonomy and Rights: the Moral Foundations of Liberalism, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford (1992), p. 111.  “I have tried to show that it is not possible to find any real difference in the 
attitudes which an agent respectively has towards the means and the double effect: both are regarded as ‘prices’ to 
be paid for achieving the end wished for.”  Spector’s explanation echoes that of Jonathan Bennett in “Morality and 
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Though moral theorists may argue that the agent’s intent is a matter of utmost importance, the 
consequences of both actions are the same, and it is my contention, then, that in practical reality, 
the agent’s intent is neither important nor determinable, leaving DDE as a lofty but useless 
theoretical resource. 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC, also called the Law of War) is a body of law 
comprising all the international law, both written (treaties and other international agreements) 
and customary (state practice), that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities.  LOAC has two 
main purposes, a humanitarian one and a functional one, which are further broken down as 
follows: 
Humanitarian: 
1) Protecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering; 
2) Safeguarding persons who fall into the hands of the enemy; and 
3) Facilitating the restoration of peace 
Functional: 
1) Ensuring good order and discipline;  
2) Fighting in a disciplined manner consistent with national values; and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Consequences,” in S. McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Vol. 2, University of Utah Press, Salt 
Lake City, Utah (1981), pp. 100-2.  A similar argument can be found in Thomas Scanlon’s Moral Dimensions 
Permissibility, Meaning, Blame, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (2008), p. 
32.  “Those who believe that there is an important moral difference between tactical bombing and terror bombing 
need to defend some version of the combatant/noncombatant distinction.  But they need not be saddled with the 
additional burden of defending the relevance of intent, or the doctrine of double effect.”  Scanlon continues on p. 37: 
“In explaining why certain actions are impermissible, people often refer to intent – to an agent’s reasons for acting – 
when in fact what makes these actions wrong is the considerations that count against it, not the agent’s view of those 
considerations.”   
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3) Maintaining domestic and international public support13 
LOAC applies to all cases of armed conflict between one or more states or organized armed 
groups, and has as its sources the Law of The Hague, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the 1977 
Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions and other domestic and international sources.  
While the Law of The Hague dictates rules for the “means and methods” or warfare (such as 
types of weapons and humanitarian concerns), the Geneva Conventions dictate rules for 
treatment of “victims” of conflict (combatants, noncombatants, and special classes of each).  
LOAC encompasses four basic principles of behavior during armed conflict: those of military 
necessity, distinction, proportionality, and unnecessary suffering.  Though LOAC is a vast body 
of behavior regulation, it is on these four principles that this paper will focus in arguing that 
DDE is a superfluous and unnecessary addition to war theory. 
 The Principle of Military Necessity “justifies those measures not forbidden by 
international law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as 
soon as possible.”14  The Hague Regulations, Article 23(g) state that a belligerent may not 
“destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of war.”15  It is important to note that the principle of military 
necessity does not imply authority for acts otherwise prohibited by LOAC, such as the 
intentional targeting of protected persons or destruction of civilian objects, unless such persons 
directly engage in hostilities or such objects become legitimate military objectives. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 “Operational Law Handbook.”  The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, 
Charlottesville, Virginia (2013), p. 11. 
14 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, 18 July 1956 (Change 1, 15 July 
1976) [hereinafter FM 27-10], paragraph 3a. 
15 Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Annex to the Convention: Regulations respecting 
the laws and customs of war on land - Section II: Hostilities - Chapter I: Means of injuring the enemy, sieges, and 
bombardments - Regulations: Art. 23. 
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 The Principle of Distinction is sometimes referred to as the Principle of Discrimination.  
It requires that belligerents distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, and between 
military objectives and civilian objects.  Parties to a conflict may only direct action against 
combatants and military objectives, unless, as mentioned, noncombatants participate in direct 
hostilities or civilian objects become legitimate military objectives.  Additional Protocol I of the 
Geneva Conventions defines military objectives as “objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use, make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military advantage.”16  Significantly, the Principle of Distinction applies both offensively and 
defensively.  Offensively, civilian objects and individuals must not be made the object of 
deliberate attack, and defensively, military forces must distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population so as not to put the latter at undue risk. 
 The Principle of Proportionality requires that the anticipated loss of life and damage to 
property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage expected to be gained.17  While not a separate legal standard per se, this principle 
provides a method by which an agent can balance military necessity and civilian loss in 
circumstances when an attack may cause incidental damage to civilians or civilian property.  
This incidental loss is referred to as “collateral damage” and consists of both unavoidable and 
unintentional damage to civilian personnel or property as a result of an attack on a military 
objective.  In determining whether the Principle of Proportionality has been met, one must 
weight the military advantage expected.  Military advantage relates to one’s overall strategic 
goals and can be assessed either on a target-by-target basis or on an overall objectives basis. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977 [hereinafter AP I], Article 52(2). 
17 FM 27-10, supra note 14, paragraph 41, change 1. 
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 Finally, the Principle of Unnecessary Suffering requires military forces to avoid inflicting 
gratuitous violence on the enemy.  It applies to a wide variety of considerations in the conduct of 
armed conflict, including types of weapons (e.g. chemical weapons) and manner of attack (e.g. 
using otherwise lawful weapons in a manner designed to inflict superfluous injury), and does not 
discriminate between combatants and noncombatants.  Of course, the very existence of this 
principle recognizes that some suffering is necessary and justified by military necessity.  The 
threshold is generally considered to be where the action would inevitably cause injury or 
suffering manifestly disproportionate to the military advantage expected.18 
 In addressing the application of the LOAC principles, let us use the example of civilian 
shields in armed conflict.  There are two ways in which the enemy may use civilian shields: 
voluntarily or involuntarily.  Given the customary nature of much of the Law of War, both 
civilians wanting to assist the war effort and enemies trying to take advantage of a situation are 
aware of the generally accepted limitations on targeting civilians.  As such, in a voluntary shield 
scenario, a civilian may attempt to impede the opposition’s mission by placing herself near a 
legitimate military objective or between ally and enemy19 so that the opposition cannot fire upon 
the target.  An example might be a group of civilians surrounding a munitions plant to aid the 
war effort by preventing the bombing of an otherwise legitimate military objective.  In an 
involuntary human shield scenario, the enemy forcibly uses civilians as a sort of “insurance 
policy” against attack.  If they can place the civilian between themselves and the opposition, the 
belief is that the opposition will be prohibited by LOAC to fire.  An example might be tying a 
civilian to a tank to avoid the enemy destroying that tank. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Operational Law Handbook, supra note 13. 
19 The author is fully aware of the political impact of using these two terms, with everyone’s enemy being 
someone’s ally and vice versa.  However, to facilitate the discussion and distinguish between sides in this 
hypothetical conflict, “enemy” in this case refers to “their” side, while “ally” refers to “our” side. 
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 Clearly LOAC permits intentional attacks on combatants, but it limits attacks on civilians 
to cases in which the civilian becomes a legitimate target by participating in direct hostilities, in 
which case they are referred to “unprivileged enemy belligerents.”20  Those directly participating 
in hostilities may be attacked in the same manner as identified members of an opposing force.  
However, in the last few decades, it has become increasingly common for the enemy in an armed 
conflict to fall outside the traditional definition of combatant (specifically, they often lack 
military uniforms, clear insignia, and other hallmarks of a defined “combatant”).  This new 
generation of foe, often in transnational armed groups with shifting alliances, deliberately and 
illegally uses the civilian population or civilian objects to conduct or conceal their attacks as a 
strategy of war, nearly eliminating the traditionally bright line distinction between civilian and 
combatant.  To determine the legitimacy of a target, then, a commander is left to the four 
principles of LOAC in conducting his analysis. 
APPLICATION AND DISCUSSION 
Let us turn now to why DDE plays little to no useful role in evaluating military 
operations and why LOAC is a more robust and effective tool.  Colloquially, DDE might be 
considered an exception to the general moral rule against causing harm.  To act morally, we are 
to eschew harm to the extent possible, and if not possible, at least we are to limit it to foreseeable 
and unintended harm.  Likewise, collateral damage can be thought of as the military version of 
double effect – an exception to the general rule against causing harm to civilians and civilian 
property.  To act permissibly, we are supposed to avoid civilian deaths, but when they are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This is a term used by the United States, but not found specifically in the Law of The Hague or the Geneva 
Conventions/Additional Protocols.  Article 44(3) of AP I allows belligerents to attain combatant status (and with it 
combatant protections, such as POW privileges) by openly carrying arms, but the U.S. has historically (and 
vehemently) opposed this blurring of lines.  This concept mirrors the prohibition under DDE on directly causing 
harm. 
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collateral damage, they may be permissible.  Few moral or military theorists would disagree with 
these two general premises.  But DDE is at once too nebulous and too limited to be effective in a 
wartime scenario.  The doctrine is too nebulous in that it seeks to draw in all moral theory, all 
fundamental truths, into one concept that is supposed to guide human behavior away from harm 
and toward good.  It is too limited in that it focuses primarily on the intent of the actor, without 
regard for the tangible consequences of the action or the practical variability of morality due to 
the extenuating circumstances of any given situation.  In her paper, “Defending Double Effect,” 
Hills asserts that DDE makes two important claims: 1) that the foreseen and intended 
consequences of an action can be differentiated, and 2) that such differentiation is morally 
significant.21  However, I would argue that the first claim is never as easy as it sounds during the 
madness of war and in fact is usually only distinguishable in hindsight.  With respect to the 
second claim, an act utilitarian would argue that it makes no difference what result an agent is 
committed to bringing about, it only matters what the agent does in fact bring about.  LOAC 
relies more heavily on this utilitarian view in weighing the factors of a military action, which I 
believe is a more stable, and ultimately more useful, method. 
Though DDE scholars do not specifically reference it, propriety of action must inherently 
incorporate two elements: a deontological/normative one (what behaviors are morally right) and 
an explanatory one (what behaviors are legally right).22  The former is the foundation of DDE – 
determining whether a harm is intended or merely foreseen leads to a moral analysis that guides 
behavior, but it ignores the second claim altogether.23  At first blush, it may seem a higher ideal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Hills, supra note 7. 
22 This idea was raised by Professor Horacio Spector, University of San Diego Law School in Spring 2014 in a 
classroom setting wherein the topic of the course was “Ethics, Law and International Affairs.” 
23 Discussed in Spector, supra note 12, p. 102.  “The fact of a result’s being intended or merely foreseen…if it 
counts at all as a moral reason, can only constitute a deontological consideration, since by hypothesis it is not 
grounded upon the occurrence of certain consequences but presumably on the attitude adopted by the agent in the 
face of certain consequences.” 
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to base right and wrong on morality rather than legality, but it is my opinion that morality is 
indeed the basis of legality.  Laws, and especially customary laws, develop from common 
morality, and LOAC is no exception.  As previously discussed, customary law plays a key role in 
the Law of War.  What is customary law if not a collection of long-standing, generally accepted 
crumbs of morality put into practice and implemented globally?  So if that is the case, LOAC 
incorporates both elements mentioned, the deontological and the normative, going beyond the 
limited scope of DDE.  I would further argue that the morality base of LOAC is of an even 
higher quality than that of DDE because the Law of War removes agent intent as a factor and 
relies only on qualitative and quantitative parameters to determine propriety of an action.   
The four principles of LOAC – proportionality, necessity, distinction and humanity – 
incorporate the elements of DDE, even Aquinas’ proportionality concept, but go even further, 
eliminating the vagaries of an actor’s intent.  In a wartime setting, action is fast-paced; decision-
making is often on the spot and could mean the life or death of one or many.  Determining an 
actor’s intent may or may not even be possible, and certainly can’t be trusted in the heat of the 
moment.  What one “intends” in garrison where decisions can be second-guessed and analyzed 
under a morality microscope is an interesting exercise but not practical or even effective.  
Pressure changes thought processes.  What a person believes his intent will be under fire may 
very well not be what his intent ends up being when the heat is on.  And after the pressure 
subsides and he is asked to expound on his intent at the time of his action, his view will likely be 
colored by what he knows his intent should have been.  Worse yet, how are we to determine the 
veracity of what an actor claims his intent to be?  In the thick of war, passions flare, but any 
military member in the world knows that legitimate wars cannot be premised on passion.  A 
DDE-style reliance on intent rather than quantitative and qualitative factors will, simply as a 
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factor of human nature, lead to distortions of the truth in order to justify action.  It is simply 
impractical in military operations.  No commander is going to tell evaluators of his action that he 
acted with malice (or decision makers that he plans to act with malice); the answer will always 
be that the harm caused is unintentional.  And what of the “intended” versus “merely foreseen” 
question raised previously?  Every action has smaller elements to it – the contemplation, the 
evaluation of options, the decision, the implementation of the necessary tools, and the carrying 
out.  To which elements do we apply the question of intention?  Using the standard military 
example previously cited, which actions of the strategic bomber are considered intentional and 
which are not?  DDE theorists are comfortable with applying the “intentional” label to the 
bomber choices regarding objective, weapon, time of day to act, etc., but then are uncomfortable 
with applying it to the full extent of harm caused.  If the action (bombing the target) was done 
intentionally, couldn’t it be said that any foreseeable harm was caused intentionally? 
Even assuming for a minute that every actor’s intent would be pure of heart, reliance on 
DDE raises another interesting and potentially insurmountable issue.  What exactly is a “moral 
truth?”   As rational, freethinking animals, it seems incontrovertible that one person’s moral truth 
can never align perfectly with that of any of other person.  DDE proponents rely on an 
assumption that there are indeed foundational principles fundamental to all morality, 
unquestionable by any reasonable being, but this is unrealistic.  Even what may be considered 
the most basic elements of morality – what is good, what is evil, to what extent are we as humans 
obligated to seek one and avoid the other – are malleable and vary based on culture, upbringing, 
understanding of the universe, etc.  What one person believes is a justifiable action may not be 
considered justifiable by another person, and who is to judge that action?  Who is granted the 
supreme authority to evaluate whether an action is morally sound?  As a purely intellectual 
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exercise, DDE has the luxury of attempting to whittle down behavior into “moral” and “immoral” 
because it has no tangible consequences.  The same cannot be said for war.  There is no luxury in 
war, no opportunity to engage in deep moral discourse about right and wrong without 
ramification, and certainly no ability (or authority) to establish some universal moral framework 
that would guide the action of thousands, or hundreds of thousands, of unique individuals with 
any kind of practical uniformity. 
Finally, DDE’s failure to concern itself with the consequences of action is inadequate for 
a wartime scenario.  Remember that one of the functions of LOAC is maintaining international 
and public support.  Granted, the public is willing to grant or deny support to an operation based 
on the motives of the actors, but for the sake of argument, let us remove that piece of the pie for 
a moment.  Much is made in double effect theory of the difference between a terrorist’s killing of 
a civilian and a strategist’s killing of a civilian, but regardless of the motivation behind the 
killing, the result is still the same.  War is war, death is death.  The number of casualties is not 
offset by some moral exchange rate where one ill-intentioned death is equivalent to two 
justifiable deaths.  If you remove the intent of the actor from the knowable data, the public must 
rely on the tally of consequences, and since intent is not realistically knowable, consequences are 
in the end what matter.  On this point, I am in agreement with Scanlon: “Holding fixed the actual 
consequences of the raid and what the parties have reason to believe these consequences to be, 
might an action be permissible if performed by an agent with one intention but impermissible if 
performed by an agent with a different strategy in mind?  I…[find] this implausible.”24 
This is where LOAC thrives.  It is conceded that the four LOAC principles are not hard 
and fast mathematical formulae for determining right and wrong in war, but they do provide 
widely accessible, understandable parameters that all operators, from the Private to the General, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Scanlon, supra note 12, p. 20 
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can rely on to create a more concrete, less complicated, and more consistent framework of 
operation.  Despite every potential operation being different from another, with different 
ramifications and effects, each one can be plugged into the same equation, regardless of the 
biases of the actor, to determine the allowable range of action.  Every decision is based on the 
information reasonably available to the commander at the time, and that information is evaluated 
in the same way leading to consistency in an otherwise very inconsistent and ever-changing 
realm of behavior.  Some might find relying solely on LOAC without a strictly moral basis 
controversial, and indeed some outcomes of the equation may be controversial, such as when 
civilian deaths are considered justified.  However, LOAC provides a concrete, analytical 
framework that can be recreated, demonstrated and evaluated, unlike morality-based approaches.   
This can be demonstrated using the civilian shield scenario discussed previously.  An 
armed enemy soldier appears behind a civilian using the latter to protect himself, fully shielding 
himself from the aim of the allied soldier.  The allied soldier must decide on a course of action, 
quickly coming to the decision that killing the civilian is the only way to stop the enemy threat.  
Is it morally permissible to kill the civilian?  Can killing the civilian be considered a merely 
foreseeable side effect of killing the enemy soldier?  Can it be considered a justifiable action 
based on the potential threat the civilian poses?  The answer depends upon where on the 
spectrum of analysis one falls.  Strict moralists, like Michael Walzer, would answer the first 
question in the negative.  According to Walzer, killing civilians is never morally justifiable, 25 
regardless of whether it is intended or foreseen, regardless of its “collaterality.” However, 
Walzer proposes an untenable concept of warfare, where operations are conducted outside city 
centers where civilians will not inadvertently (or intentionally) find their way into the line of fire.  
Should the civilian become a factor, Walzer believes it is morally required that the combatants 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Michael Walzer, “Terrorism and War,” Philosophia, Vol. 34 (2006), pp. 3-12. 
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avoid killing the civilian at all costs.  While this may seem a principled and morally responsible 
approach, it is impractical and unrealistic in any warfare scenario.  It is nearly impossible to 
conceive of a model of modern warfare that would include no threat to civilian safety.  Not only 
have wars moved out of the open field and into urban environments, civilians have been brought 
legitimately to the battlefield in positions of contractors, logisticians, technicians and countless 
other support fields (not mentioning the illegitimate presence of civilians in scenarios such as 
human shields).  In the case of the civilian shield, Walzer’s proposal would lead to significant 
risk to the allied soldier and would fly in the face of established self-defense principles.  This 
strict moral prohibition on harm to civilians is simply an unattainable goal, and I would argue in 
some circumstances, is actually counter-productive. 
Assume now that the allied soldier conducts a DDE analysis and determines that in 
stopping the enemy soldier he is likely to cause the death of the civilian.  He shoots at the enemy 
and indeed ends up killing both the enemy and the civilian.  Were his actions justified?  DDE 
would say yes if the soldier’s intent was only to kill the enemy and the civilian death was merely 
foreseen.  His action was aimed at a greater good, was proportionate and did not incorporate any 
“bad attitude” toward the death of the civilian.  DDE would say no, though, if the soldier 
intended to kill the civilian in order to ensure the death of the enemy, knowing that it was his 
only feasible option to save the enemy from causing worse harm and that there was no 
opportunity to wait until the enemy could be killed outside the presence of the civilian.  In that 
case, the soldier could be said to have intended to kill the civilian, a fact morally unsupported by 
DDE.  Either way, both the civilian and the enemy are killed but the outcome of the analysis 
pivots on the soldier’s intent.  If asked, the soldier will more often than not say his intent was to 
kill only the enemy (which may or may not be true, but would be impossible to determine 
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independently).  Is it reasonable to argue that the civilian’s death was “merely foreseen?”  I 
would argue that the closer the effect is to the goal, both spatially and temporally, the harder it is 
to say the effect was collateral or a mere side effect.26  Even if the soldier intended to kill the 
civilian in order to stop the threat of the enemy, does that necessarily make it immoral?   
According to DDE it does, but what if the enemy would have gone on to kill others and killing 
the civilian, and thus the enemy, would prevent that eventuality?  According to DDE absolutists, 
“a virtuous agent should never intend harm for its own sake, no matter what the consequences 
are, i.e. intending harm is a ‘wrong-making’ feature of action.”27  But according to other non-
absolutist DDE proponents, like Hills, the outcome may fall somewhere short of blanket 
prohibition, though where on the spectrum of permissibility it will fall is anyone’s guess.  In such 
a case as civilian shields (not by any means unheard of in modern warfare), DDE is ill-equipped 
to offer a consistent and predictable analysis, and consistency and predictability are necessary in 
the evaluation of such an inherently unpredictable field as war. 
  Ruling out DDE as a nebulous moral doctrine that has little practical applicability to war, 
the soldier is left with LOAC: proportionality, necessity, humanity and distinction.  The soldier 
must weigh whether killing the civilian is proportional to his strategic goal of stopping the 
enemy, whether it is militarily necessary to achieve that goal, whether he can do so in a manner 
that will not cause superfluous suffering, and whether he can distinguish between the combatant 
and others.  Humanity is often the simplest principle to dispense with so I will start there.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Both Scanlon, supra note 12, and Spector, supra note 12, discuss “closeness” with respect to the permissibility of 
actions and the applicability of DDE.  Spector writes, “For the point of the doctrine [of double effect]…is to claim 
that a certain difference in the subjective structure of an action is significant for its moral assessment, as something 
different from the moral assessment of the agent.  But the difference discovered is linked only to relative time 
positions, that is to say, to certain objective features of the action, and not to its subjective structure.  This point 
aside, the centrally important question is whether, in the absence of intentional or strictly causal differences, a pure 
time difference may serve as a basis for a moral distinction.  With the question put in these terms, I believe that 
everybody would answer in the negative without the slightest hesitation.” p. 113. 
27 Hills, supra note 7, pp. 138-9. 
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Assuming the soldier is not using hollow-point bullets or some other unnecessarily brutal method 
of killing the civilian (or the enemy), this principle is met.  The other three require more analysis 
from the soldier.   
With respect to military necessity, the soldier must evaluate whether another action that 
does not cause the death of the civilian could achieve the same military advantage.  In the 
scenario presented, where the enemy is hiding behind the civilian, the allied soldier must 
consider the potential ramifications of not taking the action.  In this case, if the soldier does not 
neutralize the enemy there is no rational reason to believe that the enemy will not go on to cause 
more damage, likely by killing other allied soldiers.  Clearly, the soldier in the situation is the 
only one who can know if the action is militarily necessary, but the bottom line is that the soldier 
must weigh whether it would be possible to conduct the action (killing the enemy) without 
killing the civilian.  Turning to the principle of distinction, the soldier must determine if he can 
distinguish between the combatant and the noncombatant.  In a human-shield scenario, it might 
be nearly impossible to determine whether the civilian is partaking in hostilities.  Even if the 
soldier can make such a distinction, he then must evaluate whether the civilian poses a direct 
threat to the allied forces, and if so, it would be permissible to cause the harm in question.  
Perhaps the most complicated of the four principles is proportionality.  Whether an action 
is proportionate will be determined by evaluating the relevant goods as compared to the relevant 
harms, a concept discussed by Thomas Hurka.28  First, Hurka proposes that proportionality must 
be considered in two different ways: objective proportionality and subjective proportionality.  
“An objective version assesses a war or act in light of its actual effects, that is, the relevant good 
it actually produces and its actual destructiveness; a subjective version does so considering only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Thomas Hurka, “Proportionality in the Morality of War,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2005), pp. 
34-66. 
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an item’s likely effects given the evidence available to agents at the time.”29  Hurka then 
discusses three variations on the proportionality analysis.  The simplest view is the “quasi-
consequentialist” view, which counts all the contributing goods and evils that result from a war 
or act of war and weighs them equally.  Under this view, a war is disproportionate if the total evil 
it causes is greater than its total good.  Such contributing goods could be economic gain, benefits 
of spreading democracy, etc.  The second view Hurka discusses can be referred to as the 
“traditional” view; this view weighs good effects somewhat more heavily than bad ones but 
asserts that relevant goods must be sufficiently related to the just cause of the action.  This view 
requires evils to be proportionate to goods (rather than no greater than goods).  The third view, 
which Hurka espouses as the correct one, is an “intermediate” view, which takes into account 
some contributing goods along with the sufficient goods.  It does not count all the goods a war 
will produce nor only those sufficient to the just cause, but supplements the latter with the former. 
Hurka then turns his attention to relevant evils, but proposes that there is no similar 
limitation on what evils should be considered.  “In assessing a war for proportionality, it seems 
we count evils of all the kinds it will cause, with no limits on their content.”30  In comparing the 
goods and evils, and thereby evaluating proportionality of an action such as killing the civilian 
shield, Hurka believes that consideration should be made on the broad scale: proportionality 
should not be limited to comparing numbers of victims, but rather should be a comparison 
between the advantages gained and those lost by not taking the action.  In this sense, it is my 
opinion, that killing the civilian shield would be considered a proportional action regardless of 
which method of analysis is used. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Id., p. 38. 
30 Id., p. 46. 
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The foregoing is but a very cursory example of how LOAC is applied in the field, but the 
main point in presenting it is to show that LOAC involves a situation-specific analysis that takes 
into account qualitative and quantitative parameters in making each individual operational 
decision.  It does not rely, as DDE does, on something that can be as easily manipulated as 
actor’s intent.  As stated previously, the consequences of an action should be the primary driver 
rather than intent, with permissibility of an action determined by practical interpretation of a 
factual situation.  As Scanlon writes, “It remains true, in my view, that a person who intends to 
kill noncombatants in order to shorten the war by undermining morale (and has no further 
justification for her action) acts wrongly – she has an intention that she should abandon.  But this 
truth should not be taken to suggest that intention has a fundamental role in determining the 
impermissibility of this action, in the way claimed by the doctrine of double effect.  The 
intention is wrongful because the act intended is wrongful, and the act is wrongful because of its 
likely consequences, not (fundamentally) because of the intention.” 
In the same sense that LOAC eliminates the usefulness of DDE in war, Alison McIntyre 
further illustrates the limits of the effectiveness of DDE.  She discusses six constraints on the 
application of DDE that, in my opinion, both incorporate some of the concepts of LOAC and 
illuminate the very limited circumstances in which DDE can be applied.  These constraints are as 
follows.  First, the fact that a harm is “merely foreseen” is not sufficient to determine 
permissibility of an action because, as mentioned previously in this paper, a harm cannot always 
be said to be unintentional simply because the harm was not the desired effect.31  Permissibility 
must also incorporate proportionality (similar to LOAC’s principle of proportionality).  Second, 
permissibility of an action requires minimization of the collateral harms (similar to LOAC’s 
principle of necessity).  If there are other, less harmful, means of achieving the same end, we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Spector, supra note 12, discusses this concept in more detail. 
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should take them.  Third, McIntyre clarifies the concept of intentionality and argues that DDE 
ignores the possibility of malicious intent because it focuses only on the agent’s intent with 
respect to the harm caused, not with respect to the end sought.  Fourth, a distinction must be 
made between allowing harm and causing harm (for example, the difference between allowing 
an enemy to kill a hostage and killing the hostage ourselves), a distinction not made by DDE.  
Fifth, DDE relies on intention to determine permissibility, but gives no criteria for how to 
determine what is intentional versus what is merely foreseen.  And sixth, DDE does not address 
cases in which the agent has no direct responsibility for an action.  In such cases, the harm may 
still occur but the permissibility of the action that caused it cannot be evaluated using DDE 
because the agent’s intent is not at issue. 
McIntyre’s constraints go to show that, when you eliminate all the cases in which DDE 
cannot be applied, you end up with a very narrow set of circumstances in which it can be applied, 
and even those situations are rather hypothetical and unrealistic.  As Spector states, “It should be 
borne in mind that the more one restricts the application of a distinction, the less important this 
distinction becomes.”32  It is the goal of this paper to show that DDE is just such a distinction, 
lending itself to the development of useful norms such as LOAC, but otherwise insufficient and 
relatively useless to practical wartime scenarios. 
CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of the Doctrine of Double Effect is to explain the rationale behind our basic 
intuitions, and in that sense, it has served its function.  However, there is very little that is of 
actual practical use in that theory, especially when it comes to conducting war, and indeed has 
shown itself to be convoluted and extremely narrow.  As Spector says, “The central proposition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Id., p. 107. 
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[of DDE] asserts that whether an act’s bad result is intended as a means or an end by the agent or 
is merely foreseen by him makes a difference as regards the moral standing of the act,”33 but it is 
this author’s contention that DDE’s ignorance of the consequences of an action, among other 
limitations, makes it ineffective in determining the propriety of military action.  The fact is that, 
in real life, intended effects and incidental effects are equally important in the vast majority of 
situations; DDE is only useful as an intellectual tool in the relatively minute number of scenarios 
when they are not, and by all accounts, the conduct of war is not one of those scenarios. 
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